Tax incentives as disguised coercion

A Structural Critique of Behavioral Taxation under U.S. Constitutional and Federal Law

Abstract

The term "tax incentive" conceals a structural reality that positive law carefully avoids naming: an economic constraint imposed on the individual on the basis of choices belonging to the constitutionally protected sphere of privacy and personal autonomy. This article argues, grounded in U.S. federal tax law, constitutional doctrine, and Supreme Court jurisprudence, that any modulation of the tax burden founded on an ontological status — marital status, reproductive choices — constitutes a form of discrimination that cannot withstand rigorous constitutional scrutiny. The rhetorical device of the "incentive" is analyzed as a semantic shield designed to circumvent the neutrality requirements embedded in the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The structural reversibility of these mechanisms — their demonstrated capacity to harden into explicit coercion — reveals that they are, by nature, disguised sanctions.